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CONTENTS
Subsidies have become one of the most important instruments for industrial policy purposes
in recent years, especially for the purpose of promoting high-technology industries. However,
the multilateral rules for the granting of subsidies and the imposition of countervailing duties
are still rather weak and imprecise and subsequently leave broad space to national
discretion.
In order to mitigate the international frictions that are arising from subsidization of domestic
firms and industries, an "open subsidy club" should be introduced. The establishment of such
a club should include at least three reform steps:
- To overcome the problems associated with the current material injury test, a multilateral
notification system should be introduced. It should provide that all plans to grant new
subsidies or to alter existing subsidies are to be notified to and approved by the
WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (CSCM). Given that a
signatory grants a subsidy in violation of multilateral rules, the CSCM should be
empowered to require a repayment of the subsidy. If a rule-violating country does not
react to a CSCM ruling, it should be excluded from all newly established open subsidy
clubs.
- All subsidies should be ranked according to their potential competition (trade) distortion
effects. It can be realistically assumed that the competition effects of subsidies are the
higher, the closer the respective subsidy base is to the end of the value-added chain of a
firm. For each subsidy category, qualitative thresholds that limit the provision of subsidies
to a certain fraction of the respective subsidy base should be set.
- One of the main reasons for the relatively vague and imprecise regulations on subsidies
and countervailing duties is that governments are simply not willing to give up two
important instruments of industrial policy. It is thus rather optimistic to believe that the
strict thresholds proposed above will become reality in the near future. However, to
facilitate further liberalization steps, one could think about establishing an open subsidy
club that provides a compromise between the economic need for stricter rules and the
desire of governments to keep a "free hand" for the funding of domestic industries. The
rules of this open club could provide that a country is free to exceed the thresholds
proposed above, if, and only if, a national subsidy program offers firms located in third
countries an open access on a conditional most favored nation basis. Countries joining
the open subsidy club would be free to double the thresholds proposed above.
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Subsidies have become one of the most impor-
tant instruments for industrial policy purposes in
recent years, especially for the purpose of pro-
moting high-technology industries. While multi-
lateral trade negotiations have been remarkably
successful in phasing out or at least reducing
trade barriers that have a direct impact on cross-
border trade flows (tariffs, nontariff barriers),
national governments are still relatively free to
use national economic policy instruments for the
promotion of specific firms or industries that
exert a more or less indirect impact on interna-
tional trade. Above all, the multilateral rules for
the granting of subsidies, on the one hand, and
the imposition of countervailing duties, on the
other hand, are still rather weak and imprecise
and subsequently leave broad space for national
discretion.
The failure of effective multilateral rules has
led to some major trade disputes, especially in
view of the promotion of high-technology indus-
tries that are deemed to be "strategic" for the
further development of national economies. The
current debate mainly focuses on the pros and
cons of subsidies to basic and applied research
and development, because the share of public
funding in private R&D expenditures is quite
high in some industrial countries. It varies
between 11 and 33 percent in leading OECD
countries, with the remarkable exception of
Japan where public subsidies cover only 1.5
percent of private R&D outlays. However, R&D
subsidies are not the only instrument for the
promotion of high-technology industries, be-
cause R&D subsidies often go along with invest-
ment and production subsidies, as the Airbus
case demonstrates.
1 Hence, to prevent major
disputes arising from the funding of high-techno-
logy industries, effective multilateral rules are to
be formulated not only with respect to R&D
subsidies but also with regard to other kinds of
government assistance.
The objective of this paper is to analyze and
evaluate the current multilateral regulations for
the granting of subsidies and the imposition of
countervailing duties as well as to formulate new
rules for a more effective multilateral supervi-
sion of national subsidy programs. The first two
sections briefly analyze the evolution and cur-
rent state of multilateral rules on subsidies and
countervailing duties. Then, the main advantages
and disadvantages of the current agreements will
be discussed. The final section provides detailed
reform proposals that basically aim at establish-
ing an open subsidy club.
II. Subsidies, Countervailing Duties, and the GATT: A Brief Sketch of the
History
Although there is a logical complementarity
between rules for the granting of subsidies and
rules for the imposition of countervailing duties
(CVDs), the drafters of the GATT regarded the
regulation of subsidies and the implementation
of appropriate remedies as distinct areas for
multilateral negotiations. As a consequence, sub-
sidies and CVDs are treated separately in differ-
ent articles of the GATT. What is more, restric-
tions that Article XVI puts on the use of subsi-
dies are neither the economic nor the legal in-
verse of the provisions of Article VI which deals
with the implementation of CVDs.
Article XVI draws two basic distinctions, one
between domestic and export subsidies and an-
other between primary (agriculture) and nonpri-
mary export subsidies. Whereas domestic subsi-
dies are regarded as an important instrument of
national economic policy that leads only to
minor trade effects, the drafting nations judged
export subsidies as particularly pernicious, be-
cause they are likely to lead to "beggar-thy-
neighbor" policies and subsequently to majorfrictions in international relations. Thus, Article
XVI prohibits all subsidies that reduce the price
of nonprimary exports, but gives the green light
for domestic subsidies. The second distinction
— that between primary and nonprimary export
subsidies — was based on political reality, not
on economic principles. In view of the fact that
all major industrial countries were running huge
farm subsidy programs and were unwilling to
undertake significant reforms in agriculture poli-
cies, export subsidies on primary products are
generally compatible with Article XVI, unless
these subsidies lead to "more than an equitable
share of world export trade in [the subsidized]
product..." (GATT, Article XVIB (3)).
The GATT Article VI provisions on counter-
vailing duties have their origin in the United
States' proposals for a — never to be — Inter-
national Trade Organization (ITO) charter.
2 The
negotiating parties agreed to include rules on the
imposition of countervailing duties along with
those on anti-dumping measures in the early
drafts that ultimately became GATT Article VI.
The only controversy in the early discussions
concerned the pros and cons of an injury test in
countervailing duty law (Brown 1950).
Although the United States had no such test in
its own law, it strived with success to include
one in the 1945 ITO Charter. Ironically, the
GATT Protocol of Provisional Application,
which was needed to put GATT Part II
(including Article VI) into force, allowed the
United States to continue to enforce its counter-
vailing duty law even though it was inconsistent
with GATT.
Article VI authorizes GATT signatories to
countervail against export as well as domestic
subsidies and contains only a very lax definition
of what constitutes a subsidy, which leaves
broad space for a wide range of countervailing
measures. The GATT refers to a "bounty or
subsidy bestowed, directly or indirectly, upon
the manufacture, production or export of any
merchandise" (GATT, Article VI (3)). GATT's
failure to link the regulation of countervailing
duties to those of subsidies in Article XVI leads
to the paradoxon that an importing country is
free to countervail even if the subsidy given by
an exporting country does not violate Article
XVI. This passive approach to countervailing
duties can be explained to some extent by the
low number of countervailing duty cases in the
early years of the GATT. Until 1958, only the
United States had implemented separate anti-
dumping and countervailing duty laws, and only
Belgium and the United States made noticeable
use of countervailing duties (Contracting Parties
1958). Moreover, the United States did not
actually countervail against a domestic subsidy
abroad until as late as 1973 (Barcelo 1991).
The rare use of countervailing duties as
countermeasures against foreign subsidies might
also be the reason why CVDs did not receive
any serious GATT attention until the beginning
of the Tokyo Round negotiations (1974-1979).
In 1974, the new United States Trade Act
brought about a dramatic change, because it
heavily encouraged the use of countervailing
duties. While there have been no outstanding
United States' countervailing duty orders in the
period 1959-1967, there were 30 outstanding
orders by the end of 1974; and the trend in-
creased even more dramatically thereafter
(Marks and Malmgren 1984).
As a result, most of the United States' trading
partners strived for the inclusion of an injury test
in the United States law during the Tokyo
Round subsidy-countervailing-duties negotia-
tion. The United States for its part aimed at
stricter rules for the use of subsidies (Lowenfeld
1980). The Subsidies and Countervailing Duty
Code of 1979 (Subsidies Code) tried to achieve
both objectives. The so-called "Track I" of the
code contains rules for the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties, whereas "Track II" regulates
the use of subsidies.
With respect to subsidies, the Code recog-
nizes that on the one hand "subsidies are used by
governments to promote important objectives of
national policies", but also takes into account
that on the other hand "subsidies may have
harmful effects on trade and production." It is
thus the objective of the Subsidy Code "to
ensure that the use of subsidies does not ad-
versely affect or prejudice the interest of any
signatory of this agreement." The Code provides
that signatories shall seek to avoid that subsidies
cause "material injury" or "adverse effects" tothe domestic industry of other signatories. To
lay a common ground for the determination of
material injury, the Code lists two sets of factors
that should be taken into account in an injury
test: (i) the existence of material injury should be
measured in terms of declining sales, falling
profits, a low capacity utilization, and falling
employment; (ii) the causation between subsi-
dized imports and material injury should be de-
termined either in terms of an absolute increase
of imports or in a rising market share of foreign
producers. The heading "adverse effects" sub-
sumes (i) effects of the subsidized imports on the
domestic market of the importing signatory, (ii)
the displacement, or impediment of imports of
like products into the market of the subsidizing
country, and (iii) the displacement of exports of
another signatory on third countries' markets.
The Pre-Tokyo Round distinctions between ex-
port and domestic subsidies and primary and
nonprimary subsidies as well as the definition of
subsidies stayed unchanged during the negotia-
tions.
The main innovation of the Tokyo Round
Subsidies Code was the introduction of a de-
tailed dispute settlement mechanism. The Code
provides that a country may request consulta-
tions with another signatory if it has reason to
believe that the other signatory is granting an
export subsidy or any other subsidy that causes
material injury or adverse effects. The stated
objectives of these consultations are to clarify
the facts and to come to a "mutually acceptable
solution." If no solution is reached in a specified
number of days, both parties may present the
matter to the "Committee", a forum consisting
of all members of the Code. The Committee
again reviews the facts and brings in its author-
ity ("good offices") to encourage the parties to
settle the case on a bilateral basis. If no settle-
ment can be reached, the involved signatories
may request the establishment of a "panel."
A panel consists of three to five members
coming from "neutral" third countries. It exam-
ines the rights and obligations of the parties
under the Code and the General Agreement. The
objective of the process is, again, to generate a
mutually satisfactory solution rather than a for-
mal finding of who has violated or has not vio-
lated the provisions of the Code or the GATT. If
no agreement is reached, the panel can submit a
legal finding to the Committee, which may, but
is not obliged to, make recommendations and
may, if its recommendations are not followed,
authorize appropriate countermeasures. Neither
the panel nor the Committee has any formal
power to enforce its decisions. Their only power
is the power of persuasion and of appeal to an
agreed upon international standard (Finger
1987).
In case no mutually satisfactory solution can
be found, Track I of the Tokyo Round Subsidies
Code allows the complainant to impose counter-
vailing duties on the subsidized imports. Since
the Subsidies Code, like the former provisions,
does not draw a direct link between the rules for
the granting of subsidies and the regulations for
the imposition of CVDs, any kind of subsidy can
be countervailed, be it a domestic ("legal"
according to Track II), or an export ("illegal"
according to Track II) subsidy. The complainant
only has to show that the domestic industry is
"injured" and that the foreign subsidies are the
cause of the injury. Moreover, Track I contains
no definition of the term "subsidy" so that any
complaining country is free to act according to
its own understanding of what constitutes a
national subsidy.
HI. The Traffic Lights of Uruguay
In the course of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions, the GATT signatories have made a new
attempt to restrict the use of subsidies for indus-
trial policy purposes.
3 The Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Duties finally fulfilled
one of the main Tokyo Round objectives by im-
proving the definition of the term "subsidy" and
simultaneously introduced a so-called "traffic
lights" approach that divides subsidies into threecategories, according to their assumed competi-
tion distortion effects.
Subsidies in terms of the agreement are:
(1) financial contributions granted by govern-
ments or any other public bodies, includ-
ing subnational government entities, if
these contributions involve:
(i) the direct transfer of funds through
grants, loans, equity infusion, or potential
transfers like loan guarantees;
(ii) foregone government revenue due
to tax credits or other fiscal incentives;
(iii) the provision of goods and services
other than general infrastructure;
(iv) government payments to a funding
mechanism that carries out one or more of
the functions illustrated in (i) to (iii)
above.
(2) any form of income or price support.
Moreover, the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties distinguishes between
"specific" and "nonspecific" subsidies. A sub-
sidy fund is characterized as specific if the
access to the fund is — formally or in fact —
limited to certain specific enterprises, industries,
groups of enterprises and industries, or to enter-
prises in a specific geographic region. Con-
versely, nonspecific subsidies are those that are
in effect generally available to and broadly dis-
tributed among all enterprises or industries in a
country.
The most important innovation of the Uru-
guay Round negotiations is the introduction of a
"traffic lights" approach that divides subsidies
into three categories: (1) prohibited; (2) action-
able; (3) nonactionable. For the first time in the
history of the GATT, this approach draws a
direct link between the rules for the granting of
subsidies and the regulations for the imposition
of countervailing duties by providing that prohi-
bited and actionable subsidies can be counter-
vailed under certain conditions, whereas — as a
general rule — no countermeasures can be taken
against nonactionable subsidies.
1. Prohibited Subsidies
Prohibited subsidies include nonprimary export
subsidies and subsidies that can be roughly cha-
racterized as import substitution subsidies.
4
These subsidies are actionable in any case, re-
gardless of whether they are specific or not.
With a view to import substitution subsidies,
which have not been prohibited in former agree-
ments, no grandfather rights are provided for in
the Agreement, so that all existing subsidies at
the date of entry into force have to be brought
into conformity with the new rules within three
years. A member that feels confronted with a
prohibited subsidy may seek remedy by first
consulting with the allegedly offending party. If
no "mutually acceptable solution" is found
within thirty days, the matter may be submitted
to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for panel
referral. In assessing the nature of the subsidy,
the panel may request assistance by a Permanent
Group of Experts, established by the Agreement,
whose determination is binding on the panel. If
the subsidy is found to fall in the prohibited
category, the remedy provided for is its imme-
diate withdrawal. If the alleged country fails to
withdraw the subsidy, the DSB may authorize
countermeasures by the foreign government
without a proof of material injury.
2. Actionable Subsidies
Actionable subsidies are "specific" subsidies
that cause "adverse effects to the interests of
other members" (Subsidy Agreement, Article 5)
by nullifying or impairing the benefits under the
GATT, injuring their domestic industry ("mate-
rial injury") or causing them serious prejudice.
International control over the use of actionable
subsidies is imposed via a two-track approach in
the Subsidies Agreement. The first track is
based on countervailing duty measures, the sec-
ond on agreement discipline.
The countervailing duty track may be used to
take countermeasures against actionable subsi-
dies that are nullifying or imparing the benefits
that the GATT treaty offers to other members,
or that are injuring the domestic industry of an-other member. The nullification case is not used
very often in practical trade policies and is thus
not very well known by most observers. The
GATT signatories have recognized that subsi-
dies may offset the gains from a reduction of
trade barriers that is agreed upon in other parts
of the GATT, and have thus authorized con-
cerned parties to impose countervailing duties on
the subsidies without a proof of material injury.
Much more important for practical trade poli-
cies is the material injury case. If a country feels
that its industries are injured by actionable sub-
sidies granted abroad, it is free to initiate a dis-
pute settlement procedure as described above, hi
order to impose a countervailing duty, a member
country needs to prove the existence of an
actionable subsidy, injury to the domestic indus-
try, and direct causality between the subsidy and
the injury.
The injury test is based on the examination of
the volume of the subsidized imports, their ef-
fects on prices in the domestic market for like
products, and the impact of these imports on the
domestic producers of import-competing pro-
ducts. In making its assessment, the investigat-
ing authority considers a number of factors, in-
cluding the extent of the increase in subsidized
imports, the size of price undercutting and price
"depression", and "all relevant economic factors
and indices having a bearing on the state of the
industry" (Subsidy Agreement, Article 5.4). In
order to restrict the number of injury cases, pro-
ducers accounting for less than 25 percent of
total production in an industry have no standing
to initiate a countervailing duty investigation.
Moreover, investigations must be terminated if
the amount of the subsidy is de minimis, i.e.,
less than 1 percent on an ad valorem basis, or if
the volume of subsidized imports or the injury is
negligible.
The second track of international control over
subsidies is based on agreement discipline pro-
ceedings. A member can initiate discipline pro-
ceedings if it believes that it has been seriously
prejudiced by another member's subsidies. Seri-
ous prejudice will be presumed if:
- the subsidy displaces or impedes imports of a
like product into the market of the subsidizing
signatory;
- the subsidy displaces or impedes exports of
another signatory to a third-country market;
- the subsidy leads to prices that undercut the
prices of like products in the same market;
- imports of the subsidized product result in
price depression or lost sales in the same market;
- the subsidy increases the world market share
of the subsidizing signatory in a specific product
category as compared to the previous three
years;
- the total ad valorem subsidization exceeds
5 percent of the product value of all goods pro-
duced in a certain industry of the subsidizing
country. In determining the ad valorem subsidi-
zation level, the amount of received subsidies is
calculated for each firm. The subsidies received
by a firm in a certain year are divided by the re-
cipient firm's sales of the product in this period.
It is unclear, however, how the firm-specific
subsidization rates are to be aggregated to de-
termine whether a country's ad valorem rate ex-
ceeds 5 percent;
- the subsidy is intended to cover operation
losses of a specific industry or operation losses
of a firm;
- the subsidy is provided in form of debt for-
giveness or of grants for debt repayment.
A serious prejudice challenge follows the
regulations of the dispute settlement procedure
described above. If the Committee concludes
that a member's subsidy has prejudiced another
party, the subsidizing member is required either
to remove the adverse effects or to compensate
the affected member. If no such steps are taken
within six months, the Committee authorizes the
affected member to take countermeasures. Thus,
the second track of international control over the
use of subsidies is just another — maybe some-
what more complicated — way to get the "green
light" for imposing countervailing duties on for-
eign exports.
3. Nonactionable Subsidies
The nonactionable subsidies include four types
of government assistance: all "nonspecific" sub-
sidies, and three kinds of "specific" subsidies,namely R&D subsidies, regional subsidies, and
environmental subsidies. R&D subsidies are
nonactionable as long as public funds cover not
more than 75 percent of the costs of basic indus-
trial research and not more than 50 percent of
pre-competitive development research. Regional
subsidies cannot be countervailed if the recipient
region is a clearly designated, contiguous geo-
graphic area with a definable economic and ad-
ministrative identity that proves to be disadvan-
taged on explicit, verifiable, neutral, and objec-
tive criteria. Evironmental subsidies are nonac-
tionable if they are granted as assistance to
adapt to new environmental standards, given this
assistance does not exceed 20 percent of the
costs of the necessary adaption and is given on a
one-time-only basis.
While prohibited and actionable subsidies can
be challenged under the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism and can subsequently be subject to
countervailing duties, nonactionable subsidies, if
duly notified, are immune from both tracks.
However, if — at the end of the day — a non-
actionable subsidy proves to cause "serious ad-
verse effects to the domestic industry" of a
member, "such as to cause damage which is dif-
ficult to repair", any concerned member is free
to initiate a dispute settlement procedure and
can, if no mutually satisfactory solution is
found, be authorized to take countermeasures.
IV. An Evaluation of Current Rules
The current international regulation of subsidies
and countervailing duties is a mixture of what
can be called two schools of thought on the role
of subsidies. One school (the "injury-only"
school) mainly aims at redressing the harm that
results from subsidized imports; the other school
(the "antidistortion" school) principally focuses
on the inefficiency of public transfers to private
enterprises (Hufbauer 1983).
The injury-only school takes the view that
subsidies are mainly used to remedy existing
market imperfections resulting from spillover ef-
fects of private transactions. In this view, sub-
sidies — as a general rule — only have minor
effects on international trade. Exchange rate
movements will help to offset gross differences
in public funding between countries, leaving
only minor frictions in those areas where subsi-
dies are designed to directly change international
trade flows. If there is no measurable harm to
other countries, any subsidy will distort only the
domestic economy, while the trading partners
will enjoy whatever benefits flow from low
prices of subsidized goods. In brief, the injury-
only school believes that a country should reta-
liate against foreign subsidies only when the
subsidies have an offensive trade impact and
that the remedy should be designed to redress the
impact as accurately as possible.
The main message of the antidistortion school
is that subsidies in general are bad for at least
three reasons (Hufbauer 1983: 336):
(i) As used in practice, subsidies generally
reduce world economic efficiency because
they are diminishing the gains from inter-
national trade for all countries concerned;
(ii) what is more, the public funding of indus-
tries may enable a country to create
"national champions" at its trading part-
ners' expense or to "weather out" painful
adjustments in old industries;
(iii) because other countries will retaliate
against the creation of national champions
and the weathering-out of adjustment
costs abroad, public subsidy programs
will lead to a spiral of wasteful distortions
or overinvestment in new technologies.
The antidistortion school concedes that some
subsidies are designed to offset market imper-
fections, but believes that this justification for
public funding is vastly exaggerated because any
serious effort to distinguish between efficient
and distortive subsidies would result in an impe-
netrable thicket of regulations. Most members of
the antidistortion school believe that even a weak
trade impact warrants the imposition of counter-measures which aim at offsetting, as nearly as
possible, the initial distortion.
In the current regulations of subsidies and
countervailing duties, the antidistortion school is
mainly reflected in the specificity test that tries
to separate efficient from inefficient subsidies by
analyzing the subsidies' characteristics and their
distortive potential. The philosophy behind this
test is that the internalization of external effects
in the domestic market requires a subsidization
of all economic activities resulting in external ef-
fects rather than the public funding of a small
group of specific firms or industries. The intro-
duction of a red light category can also be re-
garded as an outcome of the antidistortion
school, because the subsidies that are falling in
this group — export subsidies and import sub-
stitution subsidies — are obviously not designed
to correct for market imperfections and are thus
prohibited and can be countervailed without a
proof of material injury.
The injury-only school has left its trace in the
provision on "adverse effects", especially in
those provisions defining material injury and
serious prejudice, and in the definition of the
yellow light and green light categories. All sub-
sidies that fall in the yellow light category can be
countervailed if they cause material injury to
another country or seriously prejudice other
members of the Agreement. Even green light
subsidies can be countervailed if they prove to
result in adverse effects at the end of the day.
The adverse effects test aims at determining the
degree of anticompetitive effects and gives the
basis for calculating appropriate remedies. The
only pertinent adverse effects are those affecting
international trade. Subsidies whose economic
effects remain confined within national borders
are of no consequence to the multilateral system
and thus do not fall under its regulatory compe-
tence.
The history of the GATT/WTO regulations
on subsidies and countervailing duties shows
that the mixture of two schools of thinking —
the antidistortion and the injury-only school —,
which is inherent in the relevant articles of the
treaty, worked rather well as long as subsidies
and their counterpart CVDs were only minor
instruments of international trade policies. How-
ever, the more recent experience with a steadily
growing number of dispute settlement cases and
frictions resulting from the use of subsidies for
industrial policy purposes reveals that there are
four major problems that have to be solved in
establishing an effective international framework
for the use of subsidies:
(i) What constitutes a subsidy?
(ii) What constitutes a competition (trade)
distorting subsidy?
(iii) How to design efficient countermeasures
against members that violate agreed upon
rules?
(iv) How can be ensured that countermeasures
are not abused for protectionist purposes?
As it stands now, only the first problem has
been resolved in a rather convincing way. Much
progress has been made during the Uruguay
Round negotiations by introducing a comprehen-
sive list of government assistance constituting a
subsidy in the sense of Article XVI GATT. This
list also includes indirect transfers, such as for-
gone government revenue. In addition, the pro-
visions on "serious prejudice" even allow con-
cerned members to initiate a dispute settlement
procedure if governments cover operating losses
of state-owned enterprises over a longer period
of time.
However, the other major problems in creat-
ing a workable international framework for sub-
sidies and countervailing duties have not yet
been resolved in an efficient way. The differen-
tiation between distortive and undistortive subsi-
dies relies on three concepts: (i) the traffic lights
approach, (ii) the specificity test, and (iii) the
adverse effects test. Although the term "traffic
lights" suggests that there is a clear distinction
between three groups of properly defined subsi-
dies, the differentiation of the categories is rather
blurred. All subsidies, be they prohibited (red
light), actionable (yellow light), or nonactionable
(green light), can be countervailed under specific
circumstances. Prohibited subsidies can be
countervailed without a proof of material injury,
countermeasures against actionable subsidies
can be taken if these subsidies cause adverse ef-
fects (especially material injury) to other mem-
bers, and nonactionable subsidies can be coun-10
tervailed if a concerned member can successfully
prove that its domestic industry has suffered
serious adverse effects from other members'
green light programs. Thus, the current grouping
of subsidies is almost meaningless, because the
ultimate countermeasure against any subsidy is
always the same, namely the imposition of
countervailing duties.
Like the traffic lights approach, the provisions
on specificity do not provide unequivocal guide-
lines for the distinctions between distortive and
nondistortive subsidies. According to the Subsi-
dies Agreement, the following factors should be
considered in determining whether a subsidy
program is specific or not:
- "the use by a certain number of enterprises;
- the predominant use by certain enterprises;
- the grant of disproportionally large amounts
of subsidy to certain enterprises; and
- the manner in which discretion is exercised by
administering authorities" (Subsidy Agree-
ment, Art. 2.1.(c)).
Besides being obviously rather vague and
ambiguous and thus giving rise to disputes in
interpretation, these guidelines do not take suffi-
cient account of the economic effects resulting
from firm-specific or industry-specific subsidies.
From an economic point of view, the main ob-
jective of specificity rules is a very simple one,
namely to limit the competitive distortions
resulting from subsidies that are directed mainly
at a single industry or enterprise. It can be real-
istically assumed that the extent of competition
distortions depends on the share of production,
investment, or research and development costs
that is covered by the public funding. Hence,
any efficient specificity rule should be defined in
terms of the respective subsidy base rather than
in terms of the number of enterprises and indus-
tries that have access to the relevant subsidy
funds.
Apart from export and import substitution
subsidies, countermeasures can be taken against
all subsidies that cause (serious) adverse effects,
i.e., that cause material injury or serious preju-
dice. One of the main problems of the current
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties is that the concept of material injury has
proved to be rather ineffective on at least three
grounds:
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(i) The accurate calculation of material injury is
almost impossible and, therefore, leaves broad
space for the abuse of material injury provisions
for protectionist purposes,
(ii) Many kinds of subsidies, especially invest-
ment subsidies and R&D subsidies, do not cause
measurable competition distortion effects for
several years. By the time the effects become
obvious, the relevant subsidies have often been
phased out and it may become almost impossible
to prove in the course of a dispute settlement
procedure that the subsidies caused material in-
jury. For example, it has often been stressed that
the strength of American aircraft companies is a
result of past defense subsidy programs. How-
ever, it is almost impossible to prove that there
is a link between these past subsidies and the
economic success of American companies today,
not to speak of the calculation of material injury
to producers abroad.
(iii) The current subsidy regulations cannot pre-
vent governments from granting subsidies that
distort international competition, because a
proof of material injury is an indispensable step
in a dispute settlement procedure. Hence, coun-
termeasures can only mitigate the competition
distortions when they have occurred.
In order to remedy some of the shortcomings
of the material injury approach, the negotiators
of the Uruguay Round agreed upon a new pro-
vision in scope of the serious prejudice proce-
dure. It provides that serious prejudice will be
presumed if a country's total ad valorem subsi-
dization of a product exceeds 5 percent of the
total value of all like products produced in the
country under consideration. This provision is
the first attempt to establish objective, quantita-
tive criteria for the determination of competition
distorting subsidies. However, it can be realisti-
cally assumed that this new provision will not
considerably improve the effectiveness of the
Subsidy and Countervailing Duty Agreement
due to at least two reasons: (i) almost all subsi-
dies are granted as a percentage of specific cost
categories, above all research and development,11
production, or investment costs, whereas the
new threshold is defined in terms of product
value. As a result, the subsidy base and the base
for calculating the ad valorem subsidization dif-
fer to a considerable extent, especially in those
firms and industries where the value added
generated in the production process is quite high.
Thus, a 20 or 30 percent subsidization of invest-
ment or even production costs of a firm might in
general not constitute a serious prejudice to for-
eign competitors according to the new provi-
sions. Moreover, the negotiators have agreed
upon a specific provision for firms in a "start-up
position." In this case, serious prejudice only
exists if the ad valorem subsidization of a coun-
try exceeds 15 percent of the total product value.
The main problem with regard to efficient
countermeasures against members violating
agreed upon rules is that the process that the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Duties provides for implementing its rules is not
a process of "enforcement" as one would think
of enforcement in the context of a legal code.
There is no multilateral police force. The inter-
national track is a process mainly intended to
develop and promote a "mutually satisfactory
solution." Its basic parts are "consultations,"
"conciliation," "dispute settlement," and — if no
agreement is reached — "authorized counter-
measures." It is important to note that the Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Duties Agreement
provides no multilateral countermeasures. The
only "enforcement" mechanism is countervailing
duties imposed by concerned third countries that
are able to prove that their industries are suffer-
ing material injury or serious prejudice as a
result of foreign subsidies. Thus, in practical
trade policy, industries and enterprises suffering
from subsidies abroad are the real supervisors of
the WTO subsidy regulations. This "decentral-
ized" supervision system that is being based on
countervailing duties as the one-and-only real
enforcement mechanism has proved to be rather
ineffective on several grounds:
(i) As Spencer (1988) has demonstrated, the ap-
propriate amount of a CVD is difficult to de-
termine and depends on the kind of foreign sub-
sidy involved. A subsidy that is based on the
purchase of new capital equipment can have
very different implications from those of a sub-
sidy to pay off past debts. The former gives in-
centives to the subsidized firm to expand output
whereas the latter does not. Therefore, a higher
CVD is required in this case to offset harmful
effects on domestic competitors. However, there
is no such provision in the current rules for
countervailing duties.
(ii) The countervailing duty approach poses the
danger of retaliation, especially in high-techno-
logy industries, where the time lag between sub-
sidies and the resulting competition distortion ef-
fects is usually quite long. Under these condi-
tions, the imposition of a countervailing duty by
a trading partner might be judged as arbitrary
and unfair by the offended country,
(iii) Any countervailing duty remedy is power-
less to offset the benefits gained by subsidized
firms in third markets where no countervailing
duty relief is granted.
(iv) Countervailing duties may be abused for
protectionist purposes and — due to their price
effects — may further distort international com-
petition.
The danger of abuse of unfair trade remedies
is a general problem of the WTO approach, as
the longstanding and ongoing debate on the pros
and cons of antidumping measures illustrates.
With a view to the regulations on the imposition
of countervailing duties, the threat of protection-
ism is extremely high because the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties — as a
general rule — authorizes countermeasures if
subsidies cause material injury to the domestic
industry of other member countries. The focus
on the effects of import competition on specific
competitors (the "domestic industry") that is in-
herent in the injury concept are not in line with
the objective of preserving the "normal competi-
tive process" which is outlined in the Subsidies
Agreement. "Injury to domestic industry" cannot
be equated to distortion of competition. It is in-
herent in the process of competition that some
firms prosper while others do not. Domestic
competitors may suffer injury because of import
competition, although there is no distortion of
the "normal" competitive process. What is more,12
the provision of a subsidy, specific to a firm or
an industry, on the one hand, and the existence
of injury to the domestic industry, on the other,
hand, does not necessarily mean that the former
has caused the latter. However, it is very diffi-
cult, if at all possible, to determine whether there
is a causation between subsidized imports and
any measure of "injury." The rather rough mea-
sures that are used in practice to determine
"injury" and the causation between subsidies
and injury thus leave broad scope for the abuse
of countervailing measures for protectionist pur-
poses.
V. Reforming Current Rules: Towards an Open Subsidy Club
In view of the various shortcomings discussed
above, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Duties should be reformed by (1)
initiating a once-for-all stocktaking of all subsi-
dy programs currently in force in member states,
(2) introducing a notification system aiming at
an assessment of all planned subsidies prior to
their implementation, (3) making a clear distinc-
tion between subsidies that are efficient and
those that are not efficient with respect to inter-
nalization of nonpecuniary externalities, (4)
categorizing different kinds of subsidies accord-
ing to their effects on international competition,
and (5) establishing an open subsidy club for the
public funding of certain kinds of economic
activity.
1. Stocktaking
A once-for-all stocktaking should not only aim
at working out a comprehensive list of all subsi-
dy programs carried out in the member states
but also at paving the path to successful nego-
tiations on the reduction of subsidies prior to the
introduction of a new framework for the grant-
ing of subsidies and the imposition of counter-
measures. The procedure could follow the lines
that have been suggested by Baldwin (1987).
Each country would undertake a comprehensive
evaluation of all subsidy programs of other
countries that are causing material injury to its
industries, are seriously prejudizing its rights
under the GATT, or are nullifying or impairing
its benefits resulting from other GATT rules.
Each country would then request other members
to reduce or offset specific distorting subsidies.
The negotiations could follow the old item-by-
item negotiation technique that proved to be very
successful in the early GATT negotiations on
the reduction of tariffs. The objective would be
to phase out particular subsidies gradually, to
bind their levels for a certain period of time, or
to introduce a degressive element in the subsidi-
zation programs. The incentives for other coun-
tries to engage in such negotiations would be the
threat of countermeasures that will be introduced
under the new agreement on subsidies (see be-
low). Each country would list those subsidy
programs against which it is willing to initiate
countermeasures under the new rules. Countries
that believe that their subsidies do not violate
existing WTO rales could announce that they
would request the formation of WTO panels of
experts to make decisions on their contention.
Such a procedure prior to the implementation of
new rales for the use of subsidies and counter-
measures might at least help to improve the
knowledge about current subsidy programs in
major industrial countries and might contribute
to a better understanding of international fric-
tions resulting from government support to in-
dustries (Ostry 1995).
2. Prior Notification
In order to overcome the problems associated
with the current material injury test and the im-
position of countervailing duties, a multilateral
notification system should be introduced. In this
respect, the aid supervision system of the
European Union could serve as a reference sys-
tem (Stehn 1993). A multilateral subsidy super-13
vision should provide that all plans to grant new
or to alter existing subsidies are to be notified to
and approved by the WTO Committee on Sub-
sidies and Countervailing Measures (CSCM).
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The CSCM should be entitled to examine the
notified plans and to decide whether they are
compatible with the WTO Subsidies Agreement.
In the course of the investigation, the CSCM
should take into account written comments by
third signatories that might be affected by the
notified subsidy. After the CSCM has made its
decision, any signatory concerned should have
the opportunity to initiate a panel procedure
against the CSCM raling in accordance with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.
Given that a signatory grants a subsidy in
violation of a final CSCM or WTO panel raling,
the CSCM should be empowered to require a
repayment of the subsidy to the CSCM or, if
such an extreme approach proves to be not
agreeable, to the respective national government.
The recent Vulkan case in Germany elucidates
that this may be a very effective instrument to
bring national subsidy programs in line with in-
ternational rales. The potential threat of a repay-
ment may give an incentive to recipient firms
and industries to ask their respective national
governments to present an approval of the
CSCM before granting the subsidy, and may,
therefore, lead to some sort of a self-restraint. If
a rale-violating government is not willing to urge
the recipient firm or industry to repay the
received subsidy within an appropriate time
period (e.g., two months after the final decision),
the respective country should be excluded from
all newly established open subsidy clubs (see
below) as long as it does not react to the CSCM
or WTO raling. Only if the exclusion from open
subsidy clubs does not lead to a reaction of the
rale-violating country, third parties would be
entitled •— as a last resort — to impose counter-
vailing duties on the exports of the offended
country. The most important advantage of this
notification system is that it works without any
injury or adverse effects test and thus allows for
a quick and timely response to violations of
rales.
One could also think about countervailing
subsidies (CVS), i.e., offsetting subsidies or
government assistance that meet foreign subsi-
dies head on, instead of countervailing duties as
a last-resort countermeasure. Countervailing
subsidies have the obvious advantage that coun-
tries would be less eager to abuse this counter-
measure for protectionist purposes, because it
binds scarce financial resources. Moreover, the
CVS approach has neither the high-price island
effect nor the third-country market effect of
CVDs. However, despite their obvious advan-
tages over countervailing duties, CVSs pose the
risk of an international subsidy race in which
each country strives to overbid the other (Tyson
1992: 285). Nevertheless, with a view to the fact
that any countervailing measure can and cer-
tainly will be abused for protectionist or indus-
trial policy purposes, the turning of the scale
might go in favor of countervailing subsidies,
because financial restraints may restrict the
abuse of this countermeasure.
3. Efficient and Nonefficient Sub-
sidies
Any multilateral subsidy scheme has to take into
account that some public subsidies are granted
to improve the efficiency of national economies
by internalizing nonpecuniary externalities.
There is no doubt that the funding of universi-
ties, public research institutes, and public infra-
structure in a broad sense belongs to this group
of subsidies. These activities should, therefore,
be excluded from a multilateral notification sys-
tem.
There are, however, some marginal cases
where the distinction between efficient and
nonefficient subsidies is not as clear-cut as with
respect to public infrastructure or universities.
The first and most important marginal case is
subsidies to basic research and development in
private enterprises. As empirical research indi-
cates, basic research and development, espe-
cially with a view to high-technology R&D, can
be expected to generate considerable spillover
effects giving rise to an almost free dissemina-
tion of basic knowledge, because basic know-
ledge is hardly codifiable and thus cannot be
patented.
7 Leaving aside the possibility of cross-14
border externalities for the moment, these char-
acteristics of basic research do justify a public
funding of basic R&D on efficiency grounds.
One could even go so far as to say that not
giving a sufficient public stimulus to basic R&D
at home means offering foreign competitors an
artificial competitive advantage leading to an
economic welfare loss at home. From this per-
spective, national governments must be free to
subsidize basic R&D activities and, as a conse-
quence, these subsidies must be excluded from a
multilateral subsidy supervision system.
There are, however, two caveats to this gen-
eral position. First, from an economic welfare
viewpoint, it is of no importance whether do-
mestic or foreign enterprises are doing basic re-
search as long as the free dissemination of re-
search results is guaranteed. Thus, there is no
justification for excluding foreign firms from
domestic R&D programs. A fair participation of
foreign firms in domestic funds, however, might
only be possible under the supervision of a
multilateral agency. Second, there are com-
plaints, especially with a view to the alleged
collusion behavior of Japanese firms, that some
countries are hindering the free dissemination of
basic R&D findings. Since basic knowledge is a
prerequisite for successful applied research —
so the argumentation goes — this collusion be-
havior will give the participating firms a com-
petitive edge on future product markets.
There is an obvious contradiction between the
empirical finding that basic R&D generates
spillover effects and that cross-border externali-
ties are not much weaker than spillovers within a
country and the proposition that some countries
are hiding away basic research findings from
competitors abroad. However, the general find-
ing of an observable cross-border dissemination
of basic knowledge does not mean that a forma-
tion of successful research cartels is impossible
at all. If cartels are in a position to bind their re-
searchers to the cartel on cultural, moral, or
contractual grounds, it may be possible to hinder
the free dissemination of basic knowledge, at
least for some time. Hence, there are some good
reasons to include subsidies to basic R&D in a
multilateral notification system.
The second marginal case is subsidies for the
protection of the environment. There is no doubt
that environmental pollution causes negative
external effects; in the case of air and water
pollution these external effects often even spill
over external borders. Thus, governmental
action is needed to internalize these spillovers.
However, this does not mean that subsidies for
environmental protection purposes are to be
categorized as efficient. Most current environ-
mental subsidies are granted to facilitate the
adaption of enterprises to new environmental
standards that have been set by legal rales. In
other words, governments are striving for lower-
ing the costs that enterprises have to bear due to
the setting of new environmental standards. This
is by no means an efficient policy, even from a
purely domestic perspective. A first-best policy
would be to define prices for environmental re-
sources by taxing the source of environmental
pollution. Such a system is not easy to handle in
practical policy, but this is no reason to exempt
environmental subsidies from a multilateral
supervision system on efficiency grounds.
The third marginal case is subsidies to pro-
mote the development of backward regions
(regional subsidies). According to the "new"
growth theory, the accumulation of physical
capital at one point in space can generate spillo-
vers spreading over an entire geographic area,
thus setting in force a self-sustaining growth
process. Hence, it may be efficient for national
governments to promote the capital accumula-
tion in backward regions by, for example, sub-
sidizing the investment costs of private enter-
prises. However, the empirical foundation of the
"new" growth theory still seems to be too weak
to justify the "green light" for regional subsidies.
4. Subsidies and International Com-
petition
All subsidies that are categorized as nonefficient
should be ranked according to their potential
competition (trade) distortion effects. It can be
realistically assumed that the competition effects
of subsidies are the higher, the closer the re-
spective subsidy base is to the end of the value-15
added chain of a firm. For example, an export
subsidy, i.e., a subsidy for the sale of a product,
might exert stronger competition effects than a
subsidy to basic R&D. Hence, all nonefficient
subsidies should be grouped in one of the
following seven categories: (1) subsidies to basic
R&D; (2) subsidies to applied R&D; (3) subsi-
dies for the adaption to new environmental stan-
dards; (4) investment subsidies (including re-
gional subsidies); (5) production subsidies; (6)
sales subsidies (export subsidies, import substi-
tution subsidies); and as a special case (7) sub-
sidies for promoting the general operation of
firms or industries (subsidies covering the losses
of firms, debt forgiveness, etc.).
For each category, quantitative thresholds that
limit the provision of subsidies to a certain frac-
tion of the respective subsidy base should be set.
The thresholds should roughly reflect the poten-
tial competition distortion effects of the different
kinds of subsidies. One proposal would be to set
thresholds of 30 percent for subsidies to basic
R&D, 15 percent for subsidies to applied R&D,
10 percent for environmental subsidies, 10 and 5
percent for investment subsidies in backward
and "normal" regions respectively, 5 percent for
production subsidies, and 0 percent for sale
subsidies and subsidies promoting the general
operation of firms. In order to prevent specific
firms from gaining disproportionate from cer-
tain kinds of subsidies and to facilitate the calcu-
lation of the actual subsidization rates, the
thresholds should be defined on a firm-specific
basis.
5. Open Subsidy Club
One of the main reasons for the relatively vague
and imprecise regulations on subsidies and coun-
tervailing duties in the current WTO agreement
is that governments are simply not willing to
give up two important instruments of industrial
policy. Above all, the "safe harbour provision"
(Schott 1996) for R&D subsidies, which was
agreed upon in the Uruguay Round negotiations,
indicates that governments do not really intend
to confine the leeway to promote economic acti-
vities that they judge to be "strategic" for the
further development of their economies. It is
thus rather optimistic to believe that the relati-
vely strict thresholds proposed above will be-
come reality in the near future. However, in
view of the undisputed progress that has been
made during the Uruguay Round negotiations
with respect to the definition of subsidies and the
linkage between rales for subsidies, on the one
hand, and regulations for the imposition of coun-
tervailing duties, on the other, it may be realistic
to assume that governments are ready to take
further steps towards a more efficient supervi-
sion system in order to mitigate the international
frictions arising from the subsidization of do-
mestic firms and industries.
To facilitate such steps, one could think about
establishing an "open subsidy club" for certain
kinds of government assistance that would pro-
vide some sort of a compromise between the
economic need for stricter and more objective
multilateral rales on subsidies and the desire of
governments to keep a "free hand" for the fund-
ing of domestic firms and industries. The rales
of an open subsidy club could provide that a
country is free to exceed the thresholds proposed
above if, and only if, a national subsidy program
offers open access on a conditional most-fa-
vored-nation basis for firms located in third
countries. The reciprocal character of a condi-
tional most-favored-nation provision, i.e., a
provision offering free access for all countries
that are ready to open up their subsidy funds on
a reciprocal basis, would give additional incen-
tives for establishing an open subsidy club.
Countries joining an open subsidy club would be
free to double the thresholds proposed above. As
a consequence, sales subsidies as well as subsi-
dies promoting the general operation of firms
would still be prohibited.
For practical purposes, an open subsidy club
approach may require the implementation of the
following additional rales:
(i) A subsidy program should only be regarded
as open if at least two foreign firms are actually
participating in the program,
(ii) The objectives of the open fund are formu-
lated by the respective national government and
must be met by both domestic and foreign firms.16
(iii) Open access to national funds should not be
linked to a cooperation with a domestic firm.
The main advantages of a notification/open
subsidy club scheme are that such an approach
- allows for dispute settlement prior to the im-
plementation of subsidy programs,
- works without any material injury or adverse
effects test,
- lowers the importance of national counter-
measures and subsequently the threat of rales
for protectionist purposes being abused,
- provides measurable and objective criteria for
the differentiation between distortive and
nondistortive subsidies,
- gives incentives for the opening-up of national
subsidy funds, and thus, in the end,
- contributes to mitigating the international
frictions that arise from the subsidization of
domestic firms and industries.17
Endnotes
It has been calculated that almost 1/3 of all subsidies to Airbus industries can be characterized as production subsidies
(Klodt and Bletschacher 1992: 64-66).
See Barcelo (1991) for an excellent analysis of pre-GATT subsidy and antisubsidy law.
See also Horlick and Clarke (1994) and Zampetti (1995) for an analysis of the Uruguay Round regulations.
"... subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported
goods" (WTO Subsidies Agreement, Article 3.1.).
See Tyson (1992) for a detailed evaluation of the concept of material injury.
Currently, only "green light subsidies" have to be notified to the CSCM.
See Paque (1995) for an overview and discussion of empirical studies on the spillover effects of basic and supplied
R&D.18
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